NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAMME OF INDIA

WHY IN NEWS:

• The UN General Assembly commemorates September 26, 2020 as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
• In the meeting India reiterated that nuclear weapons should be abolished in a step-by-step non-discriminatory process.

BACKGROUND:

• The use of nuclear weapons in particular as well as other weapons of mass destruction constitutes the gravest threat to humanity and to peace and stability in the international system.
• Biological and chemical weapons have been outlawed by international treaties, however nuclear weapons remain instruments for national and collective security, the possession of which on a selective basis has been sought to be legitimised through permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995
• Nuclear weapon states have asserted that they will continue to rely on nuclear weapons with some of them adopting policies to use them even in a non-nuclear context.
• These developments amount to virtual abandonment of nuclear disarmament. This is a serious setback to the struggle of the international community to abolish weapons of mass destruction
• India possesses both nuclear weapons and extensive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities.
• India tested its first nuclear device in May 1974, and remains outside both the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
• However, India has a facility-specific safeguards agreement in place with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) allowing it to participate in global civilian nuclear technology commerce.
• India has a sizable and growing nuclear arsenal, primarily due to decades of conflict with its nuclear-armed neighbor Pakistan

HISTORY OF INDIA’S NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAMME:

• Developing a Peaceful Nuclear Program: 1947 to 1974:
  • India's nuclear program was mainly conceived by Homi Bhabha, an influential scientist who persuaded political leaders to invest resources in the nuclear sector
  • Government launched an ambitious nuclear program to boost the country’s prestige and self-reliance in energy with primary focus on producing inexpensive electricity.
  • However, the decision to develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle also gave India the technical capability to pursue nuclear weapons.
  • In the years that followed, the internal debate over whether India should develop a nuclear explosive device continued
  • In the late 1960s nuclear scientists continued to develop the technical capacity for a nuclear explosion
  • Ultimately in 1974 India tested a fission device which it described as a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE)

• The slow path towards Weaponization: 1974 to 1998
  • India’s 1974 nuclear test was condemned by many countries as a violation of the peaceful-use agreements underlying U.S. and Canadian-supplied nuclear technology and material transfers, and was a major contributing factor to the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
  • India authorized weaponization of India's nuclear capability in late 1980s as a response to oblique nuclear threats issued by Pakistan in the wake of the 1986 to 1987 Brasstacks crisis
  • At the same time, India continued to support efforts for nuclear disarmament
  • Government authorized two rounds of nuclear tests in 1998, after which India formally declared itself to be a nuclear-weapon state

• India as an Emerging Nuclear Power: 1998 to 2009
  • India’s nuclear tests were followed within a month by a similar set of tests by Pakistan, resulting in fears in the international community of an arms race or an escalation of conflict
  • The 1999 Kargil War and the 2001 to 2002 Twin Peaks Crisis heightened tensions between the two countries, although these conventional conflicts did not escalate to the nuclear level
  • The US government imposed sanctions on both India and Pakistan in response to their 1998 nuclear tests
  • After the 1998 tests the Indian government established a National Security Advisory Board, which issued a Draft Report on Indian Nuclear Doctrine in 1999
  • The country’s nuclear weapons remain under the control of the civilian Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), comprising of a Political Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, and an Executive Council, led by the National Security Advisor.
  • U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement unveiled in July 2005 and the subsequent endorsement of India's case by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), enabled India to engage in international nuclear trade.
  • In return, India agreed to allow safeguards on a select number of its nuclear facilities that are classified as "civilian" in purpose.
  • The remaining "military" facilities remained off-limits to international inspectors.
  • U.S passed the Hyde Act in 2006 to exempt nuclear cooperation with India from provisions of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, allowing for the adoption of a bilateral 123 nuclear cooperation agreement in August 2007.
  • In 2008, the NSG approved an exemption allowing the members of this export control regime to conduct nuclear trade with India.
  • Finally, a safeguards agreement for select civilian nuclear facilities was concluded between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2009.

• India as an Established Nuclear Power: 2009 to Present
  • In 2009, India submitted a separation plan to put its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards by 2014
  • In 2010, India and the United States signed a bilateral agreement allowing India to reprocess U.S.-obligated nuclear material at two new reprocessing facilities, to be constructed and placed under IAEA safeguards
  • However, the nuclear power industry did not grow as expected because India's liability laws regulating civilian nuclear power plants far exceeded the international standards for nuclear liability and held suppliers legally liable for any damages resulting from accidents.
  • To address these concerns and give impetus to nuclear power industry, India ratified the IAEA Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage in 2016
  • By 2019, India had put total of 26 reactors under IAEA safeguards.
  • Enabled by the NSG waiver granted to it in 2008, India has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia, United States, France, United Kingdom, South Korea, Canada, Argentina, Australia, Sri Lanka, Japan, Vietnam, Bangladesh etc.
  • Additionally, India continues to participate in international nuclear trade and has signed agreements with Canada, Kazakhstan and Australia to supply uranium to fuel its civilian nuclear reactors.
  • Negotiations are currently underway for concluding negotiations to construct six reactors in the Andhra Pradesh by Westinghouse.

• Recent Developments and Current Status:
  • India was recently accepted as a member of three of the four major export control regimes.
  • It was admitted as a member into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2016, Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017 and Australia Group in 2018
  • India has been actively pursuing membership into the NSG and has received explicit support for its membership from many current NSG members including the United States, Russia, Switzerland and Japan
  • China’s opposition:
    • However, China does not support an explicit membership in the NSG for India but instead proposes a two-step approach: first would be to reach consensus on a non-discriminatory resolution that would apply to all non-NPT countries alike and then discuss individual membership applications by non-NPT countries.
  • India’s argument for NSG membership:
    • In arguing for NSG membership, India has portrayed itself as a responsible nuclear power, pointing to its positive record on non-proliferation and consistent support for complete nuclear disarmament.
    • India argues that its membership should be considered under current rules because NSG is an export-control mechanism and not a non-proliferation one so question of linking NSG membership to the NPT membership does not arise
    • Furthermore, India argues that there is a precedent for non-signatories of NPT joining the NSG when France became a founding member of the NSG in 1974 but did not accede to the NPT until 1992
  • India’s declared nuclear posture is of credible minimum deterrence and has successfully developed a strategic triad of nuclear delivery systems.
  • India has not signed the CTBT, but maintains a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and supports negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that is "universal, non-discriminatory, and internationally verifiable."
  • At the same time, India has remained firmly outside of the NPT, arguing that “nuclear weapons are an integral part of our national security and will remain so pending the global elimination of all nuclear weapons.”
  • India maintains its official commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. However, during prepared remarks at the Pokhran nuclear test site in August 2019, Indian Defence Minister implied that India’s no first use policy would not be continued indefinitely

FEATURES OF INDIAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE:

• Fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons:
  • The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces.
• No First Use Policy:
  • India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.
• Consistent with UN’s principle of right of self-defence:
  • In the absence of global nuclear disarmament India's strategic interests require effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. This is consistent with the UN Charter, which sanctions the right of self-defence.
• Credible minimum nuclear deterrence.
  • India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of "retaliation only", the survivability of our arsenal is critical.
  • This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security.
  • The actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors.

• Nuclear policy during peace time:
  • India's peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that:
    • Any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat
    • Any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.
• No use against non-nuclear states:
  • India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.
• Deterrence requires that India maintain:
  • Sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces,
  • A robust command and control system,
  • Effective intelligence and early warning capabilities, and
  • Comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy, and
  • The will to employ nuclear forces and weapons
• Maintaining effective conventional military capabilities:
  • Highly effective conventional military capabilities shall be maintained to raise the threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons.
• Command and Control:
  • Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level.
  • The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in Prime Minister of India
• Security and Safety:
  • Security: Precautions shall be taken to ensure that nuclear weapons, their manufacture, transportation and storage are fully guarded against possible theft, loss, sabotage, damage or unauthorised access or use.
  • Safety: systems shall be instituted to ensure that unauthorised or inadvertent activation/use of nuclear weapons does not take place
  • Disaster control: India shall develop an appropriate disaster control system capable of handling the unique requirements of potential incidents involving nuclear weapons and materials.
• Research and Development
  • India should step up efforts in research and development to keep up with technological advances in this field.
  • While India is committed to maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both minimum and credible, it will not accept any restraints on building its R&D capability.
• Disarmament and Arms Control:
  • Global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament is a national security objective. India shall continue its efforts to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world at an early date.
  • Since no-first use of nuclear weapons is India's basic commitment, every effort shall be made to persuade other States possessing nuclear weapons to join an international treaty banning first use.
  • Having provided unqualified negative security assurances, India shall work for internationally binding unconditional negative security assurances by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states.
  • Nuclear arms control measures shall be sought as part of national security policy to reduce potential threats and to protect our own capability and its effectiveness.
  • In view of the very high destructive potential of nuclear weapons, appropriate nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures shall be sought, negotiated and instituted.

NEED FOR A NUCLEAR DOCTRINE:

• To bring transparency in India’s nuclear policy
• To gain trust of international community in India’s role as responsible nuclear power
• To communicate India’s nuclear retaliation capabilities to adversaries
• To re-instate our aim for a global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament
• To put in place an organized command structure for release for nuclear weapons
• To ensure strategic autonomy in decision making and protect India’s sovereign integrity

CONCERNS:

• Increasing nuclear stock pile in the region:
  • India, China expanded nuclear stockpile in last one year, according to a latest report by Swedish think tank Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
  • The report said China’s nuclear arsenal had gone up from 290 warheads in 2019 to 320 in 2020, while India’s went up from 130-140 in 2019 to 150 in 2020. Pakistan’s arsenal was estimated to be between 150-160 in 2019 and has reached 160 in 2020.
• Sustaining threat:
  • Insistence of some nuclear weapons states on the legitimacy of their use even against non-nuclear weapon countries constitutes a threat to peace, stability and sovereignty of states.
• India’s hint of departing from No first Use (NFU) policy:
  • This may risks fuelling an arms race or more unstable nuclear weapons deployment patterns in Pakistan.
• India’s non-participation in NPT and CTBT:
  • India’s stance against these international treaties creates doubts about our nuclear disarmament goals
• Low level transparency:
  • The availability of reliable information on the status of the nuclear arsenals and capabilities of the nuclear-armed states varied considerably
  • The governments of India and Pakistan make statements about some of their missile tests but provide little information about the status or size of their arsenals
  • The U.S. had disclosed important information about its stockpile and nuclear capabilities, but in 2019, the administration ended the practice of publicly disclosing the size of its stockpile,
• The threat of ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons:
  • In response to an alleged Indian Army secret plan, the Cold Start Doctrine — fast, punitive incursions into Pakistan territory in retaliation to terror attacks — Pakistan began to develop smaller ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons. India does not developed TNWs
• Dilution of bilateral nuclear arms control agreements between Russia and the U.S:
  • In 2019, the United States formally withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
    • INF Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate and permanently forswear all of their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 km
  • U.S. and Russia have reduced their nuclear arsenals under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) but it will lapse in February 2021 unless both parties agree to prolong it.
    • However, discussions to extend the New START or negotiate a new treaty made no progress

WAY FORWARD:

• India must battle for universal elimination of all nuclear weapons to bring sustainable global peace
• Our nuclear weapons should not be country-specific
• Our nuclear capabilities should be aimed at providing us the autonomy of exercising strategic choices in the best interest of our country, without fear or coercion in a nuclearized environment.
• Policy of minimum but credible deterrence should be the basic building block of our nuclear thinking. From this, flows the decision to adopt a no-first-use posture, and this must be maintained without change
• A cardinal principle regarding the use of nuclear weapons is that of civilian control. Only the elected civilian leader of the country should be empowered to authorise the use of nuclear weapons

PRACTICE QUESTION:

Q.“Post-Cold War trend of gradual marginalisation of nuclear weapons may be reversed in the current period of increasing protectionism and global mistrust”. Critically analyse